Who Is Michael Peter Stiassny?

http://www.stiassny.org/index.html This site is a vital resource to all New Zealanders concerned about pressing news stories not being reported by the complacent media who fear retribution from the secretive & often malevolent New Zealand Courts. The catalyst for this site is a shady and morally bankrupt accountant named Michael Stiassny who for years has preyed on New Zealand citizens with the assistance of a few old lawyer friends who have become High Court judges. His story is not an isolated case but rather a watershed in New Zealand justice.

John Key, (Then Leader of the Opposition) with Michael Stiassny. Prof Paul Morris obscured. http://www.doingzionism.org.il/about_us/activity.asp?id=454

Michael Stiassny - The smartest guy in the room.
How Stiassny betrayed his friend Robert Fardell QC

Michael Stiassny has always worked hard to get where he is. His ambitious focus has
developed in him a keen sense of when certain wheels needed to be greased to get results
and when certain arms needed to be twisted. He is accustomed to being the smartest guy
in the room and he has deftly developed the confidence that facilitates this perception.
This is assisted by Mr. Stiassny's regular demands that most people exit the room, as he
does before he will discuss Metro Water business at the Auckland City Finance and
Corporate Business meetings at Auckland City Hall.

Until December 2005, this perception was so much easier to achieve. You see, Michael
Stiassny and his good mate Robert Fardell QC were an unbeatable team until 11 December
2005.. Part Punch and Judy, part Moe and Curly, and part Enron-style empire builders.
Like the Enron executives that courted U.S. Politicians and the press and kept the wheels
of justice well oiled, Mr. Fardell proved masterful at this . An affable and rotund man who
loved to cruise around town in his Rolls Royce, Mr. Fardell was a Queen's Counsel and
former Crown Prosecutor, virtually untouchable in the legal arena in which he was most
familiar and widely respected.

Mr. Stiassny on the other hand was the innovative accountant who recognized the value of
complex accounting exercises to obscure transparency and advance his personal
ambitions. Like the Enron accountants, his success in compounding accounting schemes
to obscure accurate accounting and justify exorbitant fee charging appeared unmatched in
New Zealand. Like his mate Fardell, Stiassny was quite successful in finagling himself into
positions within professional organizations that fomented his status and influence as a
leading industry authority, particularly on insolvency matters.

Together Mr. Stiasnny and Mr. Fardell were the smartest guys in the room. But after many
years of broad acceptance and recognition for their individual and joint efforts, things
started to fall apart for them when their actions began to be scrutinized.

Of course, this was of little concern to both men initially. Men who run in the circles that
Fardell and Stiassny did are not accountable in the same way other mere mortals are. As
questions were raised of their suspicious business practices, both men became deeply
offended and outraged that anyone would question their integrity and noble intentions.
When this outrage provided them only temporary cover both men resorted to more drastic

Stiassny took the hard-lined approach, consistent with his reputation. Some would say
being an aggressive protagonist is a necessary trait for a successful insolvency practitioner
who must deal with determined charges who will attempt virtually anything to thwart a
receiver/liquidator. If true, Mr. Stiassny was arguably the best. It is doubtful that anyone in
New Zealand spends more on lawyers to aggressively pursue his interests and protect his
unfettered reputation than Staissny. While this created far more legal work than Mr.
Fardell could handle, Mr. Fardell was regularly the chauffeur driving Stiassny's legal

As with the Enron officials who developed euphemistic taglines that masked the odious
consequences of their objectives, Stiassny, elevated to rock star status by the lemmings in
the second-string business community, was on the business lecture circuit in New Zealand
getting chuckles from the crowd every time he said anyone who knew him knew his
mantra to his staff was "Get over it.". This typically followed his esoteric claim of growing
Vector Energy from a ONE billion dollar business to a FIVE billion dollar business in THREE

Stiassny claimed that the astounding growth (and valuation) of Vector was accomplished in
large part by hyping the 24.9% IPO float to "grandmother beneficiaries" and aggressively
through the media as he simultaneously constricted share sales through two outlets (in
other words, puff up demand as you restrict supply), then pegging the share price at the
height of the float and extrapolating this value to the entire company. He was so proud of
this accomplishment as he related it to the Institute of Directors meeting on 19 October 2005
that those listening might be forgiven if they believed his methods were wholly consistent
with his Chartered Accountant and Legal background. If so, they would be mistaken.
Accountants and Lawyers would overwhelmingly be horrified that a Chairman of a public
company would make such bold admissions of manipulating the markets and then take
pride in an abstract valuation that is merely indicated by the seeming results of that

But, as with the Enron scandal, it appeared that both men became comfortable that their
status and position would ultimately protect them. This would prove the beginning of their

Mr. Fardell became the subject of an Auckland District Law Society complaint in 2002. He
was forced to lie to the Law Society to cover up his misconduct and refused to divulge
billing records. While lying is not unusual for a lawyer, it can have repercussions in this
context. A High Court civil action against Robert Fardell followed when the Law Society
ruled there was insufficient cause for the Law Society to pursue disciplinary action against

The scramble then began in earnest. Robert Fardell QC played up the angle of the
bumbling lawyer who could not remember important events or find his records. He then
repeatedly professed to not understanding the relevance of his documents to court ordered
discovery. He filed and served five lists of documents after repeatedly being caught not
providing proper disclosure. There is no telling how many more disclosures might have
ensued if not for two factors - the first and least disturbing of which was the deliberate
destruction of his computer hard-drive. The second, as you shall soon see, required the
somber gathering of 10 High Court judges.

As Fardell did, Stiassny also claimed to have no records or memories of a two hour
meeting between these men in 2001 where Stiassny misrepresented company finances and
claimed to be a "good buddy" of an influential High Court judge now on the Court of
Appeal. He also claimed, in 2004, to be unable to locate facsimile records from 2001 and
before. Stiassny's lawyers also told the court that phone record details where unavailable,
in contrast to what Telstra Clear had already stated in e-mails to Stiassny's office, e-mails
that Telstra Clear had also copied to Stiassny's lawyers.

The High Court was nonetheless sympathetic to their seeming incompetence for two years
and Associate Judge Graham Lang, obviously aware of the stakes involved in his
becoming a full-fledged justice, conceded that the self-professed friend-of-powerful-judges
Stiassny would not have to number his discovery documents! Cleverly, Judge Lang
ensured that all this was done in secret; dutifully instructing his clerk to hang a "litigants
only" sign on the courtroom door and refusing to allow recording of the proceedings on the
basis that accurate recording was an attempt to "intimidate the Court".

The tide turned for Fardell in December 2005, when a prima facie case was presented to
the High Court in Auckland that he had 3 times perjured himself on discovery matters in the
civil case. This followed his disclosure of an email that proved he was acting in a conflict
of interest that involved Stiassny - contrary to his earlier sworn affidavits - an email that
was only reluctantly disclosed after he became convinced that Stiassny's actions in a
defamation suit against Auckland businessman Vince Siemer would expose his
withholding of it. His pleas for assistance from Michael Stiassny - a friend he had
repeatedly put his neck on the line for - were rebuffed.

Four days later, Robert Fardell Q C 's body was exposed on the rocks below the Takapuna
Heads Cliffs at Auckland as high tide receded.

Fardell's family immediately hired high-priced legal gun Harry Waalkens QC to ramrod the
cover up of the apparent suicide. Soon afterward, on 28 February 2006, the 'public
inquest' was conducted in secret and today, almost four months after the inquest, the
Coroner finally came out with his euphemistic findings as to the cause of death; "death by
drowning, with post mortem indicating death was immediately preceded by a fall".

As his grieving family comes to grips with the apparent suicide of this once prominent
lawyer whose actions were themselves increasingly in conflict with the law, Fardell is
unable, even in death, to escape the hand of Stiassny. As trustee of the Fardell family
trust, Michael Stiassny is still pulling the strings, legally controlling Mr. Fardell's home and
beloved cars.

Meanwhile, Mr. Stiassny faces serious allegations that he too perjured himself in Court
affidavits, no doubt this too a source of considerable friction between Fardell and Stiassny
in the days immediately before Fardell died. True to form, Stiassny is aggressively fighting
--- to delay that court case.

Written by Vince Siemer, MBA
Managing Director, Paragon Services Limited
Member - Institute of Directors in New Zealand



Managing Director
27 ClansmanTerrace
Gulf Harbour
Fax: 09 428 2521
First Plaintiff

147 St. Heliers Bay Road
St Heliers, Auckland
Fax: 09 377 7794
First Defendant

(a registered company in New
Zealand) with its registered
offices located at Level 16 Tower
Centre, 45 Queen St, Auckland
Fax: 09 377 7794
Second Defendant

By Her Majesty’s representative,
Attorney General Michael Cullen (as agent for
the Office of the Solicitor General of New
Zealand and The Ministry of Justice)
Fax: 04 495 8442


Statement of Claim
9 January 2008


Submitted by: Vince Siemer, plaintiff
27 Clansman Tce.
Gulf Harbour
Facsimile: 09 428 2521

9 January 2008

The Plaintiff says:

0.0 That at all relevant times, the Crown officials referred to (namely the Solicitor
General and Judges) were purporting to act on behalf of the New Zealand government and in their
official capacity.

1.0 That the first defendant is a trained lawyer and partner of the second defendant.

2. That the second defendant is a duly registered company with its registered offices
located at Level 16, 45 Queen Street, Auckland,

3. That the plaintiff is a businessman holding a bachelor’s degree in Industrial
Relations, a Master’s Degree in Business Administration with business interests in New Zealand and
the United States.


4.0 The First and Second Defendants (“The Defendants”) initiated a civil defamation
claim for financial damages against the plaintiff and three other parties on or about 12 April 2005 –
approaching three years ago.

5.0 Over the ensuing months the Plaintiffs amended their statement of claim three

6.0 Within a month of filing their claim for damages against the Plaintiff on or about
12 April 2005, the Defendants filed an interlocutory application requesting the Plaintiff be found in
contempt and imprisoned in that civil matter for allegedly continuing to speak and publish freely
concerning the First Defendant’s public actions.

7.0 Despite defects in their application for contempt, Justice Potter – a judge with
close personal connections with the First Defendant and his lawyer Julian Miles QC – made several
exceptions to prevailing law between May and July 2005 to allow the Defendants’ claim to proceed

8.0 On or about the 26th of July 2005 in the High Court at Auckland, the first day of
Potter J’s involvement, Justice Potter was asked by the Plaintiff’s counsel Colin Henry J.D. to
recuse herself on the basis Counsel had – at the time of his request – an active formal complaint
against Her Honour for judicial misconduct in another matter. This complaint concerned Her Honour’
s ruling on behalf of a close relative defendant in an ex-parte hearing where she failed to disclose
her relationship to that defendant. Potter J refused to recuse herself as required to do, claiming she
was exercising her judicial discretion to remain the trial judge.

9.0 Just before this, on or about 27 June 2007, Potter J’s colleague Chief Justice
Randerson denied Mr Henry’s formal complaint of judicial misconduct against Potter J in the other
matter on the basis her decision was ‘procedural’ in nature. Randerson J’s ruling made it legally
okay in New Zealand (as far as the Chief Judge was concerned) for fellow judges to rule on behalf of
close relatives in ex-parte hearings without disclosing their family relationship to the other parties so
long as the ruling by the judge could be construed as ‘procedural’ in nature.

10.0 Also on the first day of the hearing on, or about 26 July 2005, Justice Potter
denied the Plaintiff’s application that the proceedings before her be accurately recorded. This
request for accurate official recording of the contempt proceedings was raised at every appearance
before Justice Potter over the next two years – and each and every time she refused this reasonable
request without explanation other than it was her judicial right to deny accurate recording.

11.0 Before this contempt application was fully heard, the plaintiff had appealed Ellen
France’s gagging injunction to the New Zealand Court of Appeal (CA87/05). In the face of clear
evidence the injunction was unlawful provided at the appeal hearing in Wellington on or about 2
November 2008, Judge Robert Chambers – and acknowledged close mate of the defendants –
upheld the injunction on behalf of the Court of Appeal by overruling France J on contractual grounds
which had not been cross-appealed (in a ruling issued on 13 December 2005).

12.0 It is an evidential fact that the Defendants’ entire application for contempt and
imprisonment of the Plaintiff was based on hearsay and assumptions. The only circumstantial
evidence came from two ‘eye-witnesses’, who both claimed they saw a person each identified as the
Plaintiff in buildings around the time stickers that violated a gagging injunction were posted –
although neither would go so far as to say they witnessed any contemptuous conduct. Both of these
witnesses worked for the defendants’ lawyers and both had been coached by the defendants as to
their testimony.

13.0 When the Defendants wrapped up their contempt application, Defendants’ counsel
Julian Miles QC made application before Judge Potter on 19 December 2005 to cross-examine the
Plaintiff’s affidavit witnesses – pointedly telling the judge at the time of this application that the
Defendants could not prove their claim of contempt without such cross-examination.

14.0 When the Plaintiff did not oppose the cross-examination of witness Edmundo
Tunney – the witness whom defendants’ counsel claimed was necessary to establish their contempt
claim – Judge Potter twice suggested to Mr Miles to drop his application, finally adjourning the
proceedings early to give counsel time to think it over when he failed to pick up on Her Honour’s cue
that she would find other ways to ensure this was not an obstacle to their case.

15.0 Defence counsel’s open court admission at the end of his submission that he
required examination of Plaintiff’s witnesses if he had any chance to prove his case clearly
demonstrated the defendants’ application was defective, ill-advised and an abuse of Court process.
Potter J’s reaction in coercing plaintiffs’ counsel to then drop what he understood to be an
imperative application – and then Her Honour still find the Plaintiff guilty beyond a reasonable doubt
on multiple counts with nothing more than conflicting circumstantial and hearsay evidence –
demonstrates a certain lawlessness by Justice Potter.

16.0 Moreover, Potter J refused to allow the Plaintiff cross examination of affidavit
witnesses against him in proceedings where his liberty was at stake – this in violation of essential
civil rights afforded in the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 and common law.

17.0 Potter J also conducted part of the contempt proceedings ex-parte, on 5
December 2005 in the Auckland High Court, outside of the presence of the Plaintiff and/or his

18.0 In closing submissions given on 20 December 2005, the Plaintiff pointed out the
odd disparity where the Defendants’ counsel claimed to have spent nearly $190,000 pursuing a
contempt application they admitted to be deficient against the Plaintiff at the same time they had
done nothing to advance the subsequent proceedings which their contempt diversion was premised
upon, other than to change their statement of claim three times for a total of four drafts.
Defendants’ counsel Mr Miles would later inform Potter J that the Plaintiffs had simply been too
busy to advance the substantive matter. Potter J accepted this implausible excuse without

19.0 Potter’s subsequent findings of guilt beyond reasonable doubt on multiple counts
of contempt and her assessment of $200,000 in costs against the Plaintiff defied every applicable
law, case precedent and pure logic, instead relying solely on the hardy annual of judicial discretion.

20.0 In a related High Court action (CIV2003 404 5782) the Defendants’ counsel
McElroys were caught out inflating cost figures and submitting these padded cost figures to the
Court for sealing. When this matter went to a Court of Appeal hearing (CA172/07) on 18 June 2007,
Susan Glazebrook J showed open contempt and disrespect for the Plaintiff, refused the submission
of legal evidence from the lower court which exposed overcharging by Defendants’ counsel, allowed
new evidence from the Bar by Defendants’ counsel and openly defended the criminal practice of
lawyers padding their bills.

21.0 In or about October 2006, the Defendants, by their solicitors, lodged a caveat on
the Plaintiff’s residence and claimed they intended to pursue bankruptcy, if necessary, to collect
their costs awards granted by the Court.

22.0 In correspondence with Ray White Manager Gary Brown in August 2007, the
Defendants refused to release the caveat they registered on the residence at 27 Clansman Terrace,
Gulf Harbour, thereby preventing its unimpeded sale - to the detriment of the Siemer Family Trust
which owns the property.

23.0 Potter J’s ruling of guilty and the unprecedented costs were appealed by Plaintiff to
the New Zealand Court of Appeal in a hearing on 8 February 2007 (CA55/06) where it was
demonstrated in viva voce examination of the witness Alan Garrett – whom Potter J had earlier
denied the Plaintiff the ability to cross-examine – that the eye-witness had been coached by him.
More troubling, it was cogently demonstrated this witness materially changed his identification after
being coached by Mr Garrett and that the defendants withheld exculpatory evidence. This witness
evidence – caught on audiotape at the hearing – was ignored by the Court of Appeal in upholding
Potter J’s ruling and dismissing the appeal.

24.0 Cross examination of this witness at this hearing also revealed that comments by
the Plaintiff which High Court Justice Ellen France had earlier ruled were false (in support of Her
Honour’s gagging injunction against all the Defendants) were indeed truthful and accurate by the
Defendants’ own definition. In these circumstances the Court of Appeal were legally compelled at
that moment and without hesitation to revoke the gagging injunction – which itself was a
contravention of prevailing New Zealand law. Court of Appeal President Willy Young outright refused
to abide by his legal obligations in this regard (evidence of His Eminence the President’s unlawful
refusal again caught on audiotape at the hearing).

25.0 In dismissing the Plaintiff’s appeal, His Eminence, President of the Court of
Appeal and beacon of everything honourable in New Zealand Willy Young wrongfully attempted to
defend Potter J’s unconscionable conduct at the initial hearing by suggesting in His Honour’s written
decision on 4 April 2007 (CA55/06 & CA150/06) Her Honour’s conduct was likely caused by the
Plaintiff’s actions – including a suggestion Potter J was justly insulted by the reasonable request the
hearing before her be accurately recorded. This defence of Potter J‘s conduct by Young P was
despite the extensive and uncontested evidence of seven witnesses – including that of the plaintiffs’
sole witness – all stating the Plaintiff was respectful and considerate toward Potter J.

26.0 The Plaintiff then appealed the Court of Appeal dismissal to the New Zealand
Supreme Court (SC26/2007), as well as filed a judicial misconduct complaint against Judith Marjorie
Potter J with the Judicial Conduct Commissioner. The receipt of this formal complaint was
acknowledged by the Judicial Conduct Commissioner Ian Haynes in a letter dated 11 June 2006.

27.0 Mr Ian Haynes is a close friend and former business partner of Judy Potter J. As
an active lawyer and partner with Kensington Swan, he also has an inherent conflict of interest in
holding errant judges accountable. Kensington Swan is the largest reported benefactor of Legal Aid
payments in New Zealand, with the firm reportedly receiving $2.26 MILLION in Mr Haynes first full
year as Judicial Conduct Commissioner.

28.0 As of the date of this counterclaim, Mr Haynes has failed to rule on the Plaintiff’s
formal complaint against Potter J – a complaint that includes 18 uncontested and sworn witness
statements in relation to Her Honour Ms. Potter’s judicial misconduct.

29.0 The Judicial Conduct Commissioner – specifically established by the New Zealand
Parliament to hold corrupt and unfit judges accountable – was created by The Judicial Conduct
Commissioner and Judicial Conduct Panel Act 2004. Since then, not one of more than 200 formal
complaints of judge misconduct has been advanced by Mr Haynes to a formal Panel investigation
as provided for in the Act. This extensive empirical evidence further demonstrates how ineffective
his office is in holding errant and unfit judges accountable.

30.0 The Judicial Conduct Commissioner also regularly employs his lawyer friends at
direct expense to the Government and citizens of New Zealand. Mr Haynes has refused to divulge
these financial figures and what lawyer mates he is paying on the basis he is exempt from the
Official Information Act 1982 which compels other Government agencies to properly divulge how and
where agencies spend monies and use information.

31.0 On 10 February 2006, the Plaintiff filed a perjury cause of action in the Auckland
High Court (CIV2006 404 593) against the First Defendant for the demonstrably false 8 April 2005
affidavit the First Defendant used to obtain the gagging injunction against the plaintiff and three
other defendants. In a ruling dated 9 August 2006, Associate Judge Doogue dismissed the perjury
claim on the basis the Defendants were claiming witness immunity from prosecution. The
unquestionable effect of this judgment by Doogue AJ is that anyone can commit perjury in the New
Zealand Courts if the person lodging the false claim then claims they are also a witness in the

32.0 In or about the first week of December 2006, the Plaintiff submitted a formal
complaint to the NEW ZEALAND POLICE against the First Defendant detailing his perjury. This
criminal complaint was supported by a sworn affidavit with hard evidence appended. It was
registered by the Police as Complaint no. 061211-9310 on 11 December 2006. As of the date of
this counterclaim – well over a year later – the Plaintiff has not received any prosecution decision
from the Police. Despite repeated emails to the detective put in charge of the complaint (Brett
Henshaw), he has been unable to get any information as to the status of the complaint since 27
November 2007.

33.0 As a direct result of judicial decisions in the Defendants’ unproven civil claim
(CIV2005 404 1808), they were able to get the Auckland High Court to place Paragon Services
Limited, a company owned by the plaintiff and his wife, into liquidation on 15 March 2007.

34.0 In June 2007, Potter J had been involved in the matter for more than two years.
She was intimately aware the Defendants had done virtually nothing to advance their defamation
claim in two years and that it was the Plaintiff who had filed an application a year earlier to advance
the substantive matter. Potter J was also fully aware the Plaintiff had filed a formal misconduct
complaint against her with the Judicial Conduct Commissioner. She had specifically corresponded
with her friend the Commissioner on how to avoid it.

35.0 With this as a backdrop Potter again refused to recuse herself from the case,
refused accurate recording of proceedings and insisted upon railroading the second contempt
hearing when she knew the Plaintiff would be out of the country – hearing the matter ex-parte on 4
July 2007.

36.0 Potter J granted a writ of arrest at that ex parte hearing and the Plaintiff was
arrested and immediately remanded to custody when he returned to Auckland Airport on 12 July
2007. This was the second time she had wantonly conducted ex-parte proceedings in a trial for
committal (the first time being in the Auckland High Court on 5 December 2005).

37.0 Over the two days of the sentencing hearing conducted on 12 – 13 July 2007,
Potter J denied the Plaintiff bond or the ability to access his legal authorities or files despite him
being self-represented. She then sentenced him to six weeks in prison, suggesting this
unprecedented sentence was based upon at least one case where no prison time was served yet
Potter J claimed a three week prison term eventuated.

38.0 Potter J had not consulted the Plaintiff when she set the contempt hearing for 4
July 2007. Her Honour then denied his prompt and reasonable request for the hearing to be
adjourned for a date before or after his overseas trip. In contrast, when Plaintiffs’ counsel asked for
a deadline extension to Her Honour’s timetable for cost submissions immediately after this railroad
hearing, she quickly complied in granting the extension.

39.0 After the second contempt hearing before Potter J, Her Honour unlawfully removed
the Plaintiff’s submissions concerning the open issue of costs from the High Court File without
notice to the parties. Potter J then claimed (falsely) in her 31 August 2007 ruling granting a further
$51,791.03 in costs to her plaintiff mates that the Plaintiff had failed to make submissions – this
after Her Honour had personally and unilaterally instructed Court staff to remove such submissions.

40.0 At 10.00 am of the day the Plaintiff was taken into custody, Potter J had in her
hands The New Zealand Supreme Court’s refusal to hear the appeal of her earlier contempt decision
which had been issued in Wellington only minutes before. While refusing to consider the
substantive appeal, The Honourable Supreme Court did go so far as to rule that Potter J was not

41.0 Not insignificantly, the First Defendant partnered with the husband of New Zealand
Supreme Court Chief Justice Sian Elias on the Board of Directors of Vector Limited weeks before
this second contempt hearing that resulted in the Plaintiff’s imprisonment.

42.0 The First Defendant had previously stated to the Plaintiff and his wife that Court of
Appeal Justice Grant Hammond was a friend of his – this statement being in direct response to his
accounting scams being challenged by them.

43.0 Shortly after the Plaintiff was sent to Mt Eden Prison by Potter J, the Solicitor
General of New Zealand David Collins QC (“S-G”) got directly involved to unduly protect the First
Defendant in these proceedings while he unlawfully attacked the Plaintiff’s business interests. One
example of the latter was a letter dated 19 July 2007 from the S-G to Enlighten Hosting Limited
(“Enlighten”) in which the S-G threatened legal action by the Crown if Enlighten did not take
immediate action detrimental to the Plaintiff’s business interests in relation to a website they were

44.0 In response to the threat by the S-G on behalf of the Crown, Enlighten immediately
shut down the website www.kiwisfirst.co.nz. Enlighten unilaterally reactivated the website within
days after they became convinced the S-G had operated outside the law and had no legal authority
to make the demand threat he had made toward them.

45.0 The Office of the Solicitor General would later verbally deny that the S-G had sent
such a letter until colleagues of the Plaintiff obtained a copy of it.

46.0 While the Plaintiff was in Mt Eden Prison, a Parliamentary Petition was sponsored
by the Honourable Member of Parliament Rodney Hyde of Epsom requesting an inquiry into the
circumstances of the Plaintiff’s imprisonment by Potter J. In direct response, the S-G Mr Collins
unlawfully killed the advancement of this official inquiry by incorrectly telling Parliamentary
Committee staff the matter was sub judice and that he would soon be lodging additional charges for
contempt against the Plaintiff. Discovery is required to determine the exact method and dates of
the S-G’s actions in unduly killing the Parliamentary Select Committed inquiry.

47.0 As the highest operating law enforcement officer of New Zealand, the Solicitor
General certainly knew or should have known before his misrepresentation to Parliament:

47.1 The contempt matter was unquestionably concluded and was not sub judice.

47.2 Any further attempt by him to prosecute a contempt constituted double jeopardy.

48.0 In addition to being unlawful, the actions by the Solicitor General were extremely
unusual, in that:

48.1 This Crown Officer was expending extraordinary public resources to assist one person (Michael
Stiassny) in his unproven civil claim against a law-abiding citizen,

48.2 This Crown Officer’s actions had the certain effect of unduly protecting an errant judge to the
detriment of the laws he had sworn an oath to uphold and protect.

48.0 As it turned out, the Solicitor General’s claim that the matter was sub judice
proved a ruse as well as a misrepresentation to Parliament. Once he killed the Parliamentary
Inquiry into Potter J’s unlawful imprisonment of the Plaintiff, Mr Collins took no further action and hid
the evidence of his involvement.

49.0 Both counsel representing the Plaintiff in this ordeal – namely Colin Henry J.D. and
Grant Illingworth Q.C. – spoke scathingly of Judy Potter J’s unfitness to be a Judge. Mr Henry, as
previously mentioned, had caught Potter J out for ruling on behalf of her brother-in-law without
disclosing her relationship. Mr Illingworth called Judge Judy Potter “The Worst”, “An
embarrassment to the Court”, and saying of Her Honour “When she gets a bee in her bonnet, the
law does not matter.” To have such experienced senior counsel speak so disdainfully of Potter J’s
unfitness as a judge is extremely telling.

50.0 As a law-abiding citizen who must therefore put his faith for justice in the very
Crown institutions which have been repeatedly demonstrated to break the laws of the land and Court
rules to his detriment and damage over long periods, the Plaintiff is left with no other choice but to
adjoin the Crown in this action. Without the assistance of an Honourable Court, the Crown and
Defendants are likely to continue their efforts to pervert justice, make an absolute mockery of due
process and forever tarnish the honourable reputation of the New Zealand Court system.




51.1 The Defendants initiated their defamation claim against the Plaintiff on a single perjured
affidavit, then dragged the chains of their substantive claim which they filed to coerce the Court into
wrongfully granting an injunction. They simultaneously embarked on a vicious campaign of deceit,
abuse of judicial process, unlawful evasion, financial attrition and efforts designed solely to prevent
the Plaintiff and the other defendants from defending against their fabricated defamation claim. In
doing so, the Defendants have set out specifically to defeat the course of justice.

51.2 The Court and Crown, by their actions, are a complicit party in the abuse of judicial
process, as evidenced by the following:

51.2.1 In a non evidential hearing 28 April 2005 where the only evidence before Ellen France J
were conflicting and untested affidavits, Her Honour France J nevertheless ruled (5 May 2005) it was
clear to her the unquestionable attempt at substantial fee overcharging by the Defendants was
inadvertent AND that the First Defendant had never attempted to label Paragon Services Limited
insolvent. NO judge could possibly have logically reached these conclusions on the extremely
limited, materially conflicting and untested evidence Ellen France J professed to base this decision
on – in what was not even an evidential hearing.

51.2.2 When Ellen France J’s injunction ruling could not be sustained on legal grounds on
appeal, Robert Chambers J nonetheless upheld it at the Court of Appeal by overruling France J on a
contractual point that had not been cross-appealed and, further, was legally unenforceable due to
well known legal misrepresentations by Robert Fardell QC and the First Defendant (who has an
LLB). [(CA87/05) 13 December 2005]

51.2.3 Rodney Hansen J: Ruled costs against the Plaintiff and Paragon Service Limited and in favour of the
Plaintiffs on an interlocutory application by the plaintiff where the Plaintiff was successful on 7 of 9
points. Where costs normally follow the event, such a reverse ruling is unprecedented and speaks
of judicial bias. Later ignored his own ruling on meritorious legal arguments that favoured the Plaintiff
by striking out parts of his statement of defence. This ruling is currently on appeal to the Court of
Appeal. Exempted the defendants from their legal obligations in providing discovery when it
became clear to His Honour the defendants had been deceptive on discovery and had no intention
of abiding by their legal obligation regarding discovery. Unlawfully assisted the defendants by allowing them to retreat from their original
allegations and ring-fence an extremely narrow interpretation of their defamation claim that had no
foundation in law or fact.

51.2.4 Judy Potter J: repeatedly refused to recuse herself where she had an unquestionable and serious
conflict of interest, repeatedly conducted hearings outside the presence of the plaintiff or his lawyer in
hearings where the Plaintiff’s liberty was at stake, repeatedly refused to permit accurate recording of proceedings without explanation other
than to say it was within her power to do so, Never challenged or even questioned the Defendants as to why none of the half dozen
people whom hearsay witnesses claimed actually witnessed breaches of the injunction by the
Defendants came forward or provided evidence. Used contrived case law to support an unprecedented six week prison sentence in this
unproven civil defamation case where Her Honour personally had witnessed two years of diversion
and procrastination by the defendants on the very matter all their superfluous applications hung on, Awarded an unprecedented $200,000 in costs in favour of the defendants in an
interlocutory application. (This award, which is 4-5 times more than any comparable case, was so
indefensible that the Court of Appeal chose not to even address it on legal grounds as they are
required to do – saying instead it was simply within Judge Potter’s discretion to award such an
outlandish sum. [CA150/07 4 April 2007, Young P for the Court] ) Later demanded this ridiculous and untenable sum be paid to the defendants
immediately. Debarred the Plaintiff’s defence after it became evident two long years later the
Defendants were unprepared to advance the matter unless and until the Judge killed off the Plaintiff
ahead of trial. Falsely claimed submissions were not filed by the Plaintiff after she secretly had these
submissions removed from the Court file.

51.2.5 Potter J found the Plaintiff “Guilty Beyond Reasonable Doubt”: Solely on a newspaper article where not even the reporter gave evidence. Solely on hearsay and double-hearsay evidence – as in the case where Alan Garrett
claimed (solely by affidavit) that flyers were in envelopes addressed to unconnected non-parties.
Not one of these people who the envelopes were addressed to provided evidence. Solely on witness testimony where the witness provided vastly conflicting descriptions of
the accused and described stickers with vastly different shapes and messages than had been
supplied in evidence. Based upon the unrepresented Plaintiff’s non-responses, “no evidence” and refusal to
submit to cross-examination.

51.2.6 The Solicitor General of New Zealand David Collins QC – the second highest law
enforcement officer in the land: Made material misrepresentations to Parliament in order to unduly deprive the Plaintiff his
legal rights, protect an errant judge and unduly assist the Defendants in an unproven civil claim. Unlawfully interfered with private commerce by using his official position to threaten a
legitimate and lawful enterprise, with the effect of damaging the Plaintiff and his business
associates. Used his official position as a Crown enforcement officer to advance a personal agenda
that was inconsistent with the Crown’s public role, obligations and objectives. Knowingly concealed the extent of his involvement, thereby demonstrating he understood
what he was doing was unlawful, as well as an egregious breach of his sworn oath to uphold and
protect the laws of New Zealand.

51.2.7 Robertson J, acting in his official capacity as Judge for the New Zealand Court of
Appeal, unlawfully attempted to coerce the Plaintiff to provide his personal financial information to
the Defendants for the intended purpose of allowing the Defendants to financially incapacitate – if
not bankrupt – the Plaintiff ahead of trial (and thereby avoid having to prosecute their false claim)
despite extensive evidence the means by which they were seeking to financially incapacitate the
Plaintiff was itself a fraudulent abuse of process.

51.3 The concerted actions of the parties above had the overriding purpose and effect of
defeating the course of justice and amounted to a conspiracy to obstruct, prevent, pervert and/or
defeat the course of justice as provided in Section 116 of the Crimes Act 1961.

51.4 All the defendants named in this alleged conspiracy to defeat the course of justice are
highly touted legal minds in New Zealand. They cannot realistically expect to find refuge by
professing ignorance of the laws of New Zealand.

51.5 By debarring the Plaintiff’s defence, Potter J denied the Plaintiff his essential legal
right to defend himself in an unproven civil defamation claim where Her Honour has already sent the
law-abiding Plaintiff to prison.

51.6 By exempting the Plaintiffs from proper discovery and allowing them to retreat from the
initial allegations of defamation they made against the Plaintiff, Rodney Hansen J has defiled
elementary laws of the land with the effect of further insulating the Defendants from legal obligations
and accountability.

51.7 By ruling the First Defendant is immune from criminal perjury charges on the basis the
First Defendant is now a witness whose own sworn lies have afforded him witness immunity, Doogue
AJ has set the stage for an enormous judicial travesty in circumstances where Potter J has ruled
the Plaintiff cannot even defend himself against these lies and Rodney Hansen J has ruled the
Defendants do not have to stand by or prove their initial allegations of defamation against the
Plaintiff - or merely conform to discovery requirements.

Wherefore the Plaintiff Claims Against the Defendants Jointly and Severally for:

(a) General damages of $1,250,000

(b) Compensation for unjust incarceration at Mt Eden Prison in the amount of $100,000.

(c) Aggravated damages of $200,000.

(d) Special damages for economic loss that has or might arise from the defendants’ malicious
actions (details to be provided in due course).

(e) Expenses related to the house at 27 Clansman Terrace, Gulf Harbour from July 2007 due to
the inability to sell with clear title due to actions of Crown and Defendants in these proceedings.

(f) Exemplary damages of $2,150,000.

(g) Interest on costs and damages at the rate of 8.25% (except for ongoing Clansman Terrace
expenses incurred).

(h) Costs.

And from the Crown the Plaintiff seeks an ex gratia payment equal to the award against the


51.0 The Plaintiff repeats paragraphs 1 – 50.



52.1 By dragging the chains of their substantive defamation claim filed merely to coerce the
Court into wrongfully granting an injunction, as they simultaneously embarked on a vicious and
costly campaign to prevent the Plaintiff defending the Defendants’ fabricated defamation claim, the
Defendants are guilty of abusing the judicial process with the objective of denying the Plaintiff his
legal rights as guaranteed under the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990.

52.2 The gagging injunction by High Court Justice Ellen France was unlawful and was
demonstrated to the Court of Appeal as being unlawful, as well as obtained by deceit. The law is
well-established that the Court has an obligation to correct abuse of judicial processes when they
have been convincingly demonstrated to have occurred, particularly where the abuse has caused
harm and deprivation of guaranteed liberties. There is no provision in law for a judge to insist he has
the judicial discretion to ignore certain exculpatory evidence with the designed result of ignoring the
law he has sworn to serve, suppressing a citizen’s guaranteed legal rights, unjustly putting that
citizen on the road to personal bankruptcy and unjustly putting that citizen in jail, as Willy Young P

52.3 Chambers J’s 13 December 2005 ruling on behalf of the Court of Appeal in these
proceedings (CA87/05) abused His Honour’s position solely to improperly assist the Defendants –
who are his admitted mates. Chambers J’s additional ruling that the Plaintiff has not lost anything
by the injunction is an egregious affront to the Bill of Rights Act 1990 as intended and enacted by
Parliament on behalf of the people of New Zealand.

52.4 While it should be evident to anyone looking at this case that justice can not be relied
upon from New Zealand Courts, it is every person’s minimum right to be afforded respect from New
Zealand Judges AND for those judges not to conceal criminal conduct. When Susie Glazebrook J
exhibited outright contempt and disrespect for the Plaintiff and openly defended the criminal practice
of lawyers padding their bills, Her Honour’s actions stepped beyond the realm of judicial error into
the certain arena of judicial misconduct. Her Honour’s misconduct most certainly covered up
criminal conduct by the Defendants and their counsel, as well as aided and abetted the Defendants
and their counsel’s pursuit of bankruptcy against the Plaintiff and the unjust barring of his defence
in these proceedings.

52.5 Potter J’s rulings denying the Plaintiff the ability to cross-examine witnesses against
him – or even the ability to be present – at hearings where his liberty was at stake, and where he
would ultimately be found guilty and sent to prison, violates the must fundamental laws of the land,
was a blatant contravention of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990.

52.6 When Potter J subsequently denied the unrepresented Plaintiff access to his legal
authorities and files for sentencing, Her Honour further demonstrated her wanton disregard for the
laws of the land and her oath of office. When Potter J then silently took the Plaintiff’s legal
submissions out of the Official Court File and then claimed they had not been received Her Honour
likely committed an egregious breach of her public trust with the certain effect of further assisting
the Defendants, harming the Plaintiff and covering up her own judicial misconduct.

52.7 The Plaintiff has an inalienable right to transparent and natural justice. In
circumstances where Potter J was the subject of two separate, active and serious judicial
misconduct complaints against her at the very time she was asked to recuse herself and provide
accurate recording of hearings, Her Honour’s failure to do either must minimally be cause for
censure and a new trial. That Her Honour’s fellow judges – despite this knowledge – covered up her
misconduct instead is without question. The Plaintiff has suffered damage as a result and this
damage is still ongoing.

52.8 With the complicity of the New Zealand Courts, the Defendants have placed a caveat
on property owned by the Plaintiff’s family trust, thereby blackmailing the Plaintiff to succumb to the
Defendants’ unlawful demands in order to prevent unrelated parties to the proceedings from unlawful
restraint of their legal rights.

52.9 A New Zealand Citizen has the right to expect the New Zealand Police to act
responsibly, without fear or favour and to enforce the laws of the land. The Police failures to
address a thoroughly documented criminal complaint in the matter CIV2005 404 1808, and the
Plaintiff’s inability to merely get an update on the 13 month old criminal complaint, cogently
demonstrates the New Zealand Police – for whatever reason or reasons – are unwilling or incapable
of fulfilling their lawful function of competently investigating and acting on a serious criminal
complaint where powerful courtiers are committing the unlawful acts against law-abiding citizens.

52.10 Systemic defects in the Office of the Judicial Conduct Commissioner have further
denied the Plaintiff his fundamental right to due process. In addition to the inherent conflict of
interest of Commissioner Ian Haynes in holding judges accountable, his office’s exemption from
compliance with the Official Information Act 1982 and his utter failure to find one complaint worthy of
an investigation in three years, he has also claimed he is unable to access anything other than (a
very narrow interpretation of) “documents”, to the exclusion of digital and electronic media and
anything else that is not already written down in document format. This untenable position in law by
the Commissioner contradicts every Court definition which labels an extensive array of mediums as

52.11 Given the well-known practice of certain New Zealand judges altering written documents
to disguise their misconduct, the Commissioner’s position amounts to nothing short of an open
invitation to further commit and conceal judicial misconduct, making a farce of his public duty – as
Parliament intended and the New Zealand public understand it – to expose judicial misconduct. An
extremely cogent example is the Plaintiff’s complaint against Susan Glazebrook J, where the
Commissioner claimed not to have access to Court hearing audiotapes which proved Judge
Glazebrook’s guilt. He then dismissed the complaint as baseless.

52.12 Commissioner Haynes also has employed a stealthy ‘legal trick’ to protect unfit and
corrupt judges. He relies on “judge friendly” legal opinions from outside lawyers to dismiss valid
complaints against Judges. In this “one hand washes the other” approach, the Commissioner
escapes charges of malfeasance and cronyism by simply saying he relied on an ‘independent’ legal
opinion, while the ‘independent expert’ he picked out and paid with government funds cannot be held
accountable because he/she does not have the same legislative obligation to expose corrupt judges
as the Commissioner has and his/her fiduciary duty is only to their client (Commissioner Haynes).

52.13 Every New Zealand citizen has the minimal expectation and right not to be unlawfully
targeted by the same institutions the Crown has set up to uphold and protect the very laws and civil
liberties they have so profoundly violated with impunity. The evidence is extensive that the Crown
has effectively bankrolled an extensive unlawful assault by many of its officers against the Plaintiff
and many people closely associated with him.

Wherefore the Plaintiff Claims Against the Defendants Jointly and Severally

a. General damages of $1,250,000

b. Compensation for unjust incarceration at Mt Eden Prison in the amount of $100,000.

c. Aggravated damages of $200,000.

d. Special damages for economic loss that has or might arise from the defendants’ malevolent
actions (details to be provided in due course).

e. Expenses related to the house at 27 Clansman Terrace, Gulf Harbour from July 2007 due to
the inability to sell with clear title due to actions of Crown and Defendants in these proceedings.

f. Exemplary damages of $2,150,000.

g. Interest on costs and damages at the rate of 8.25% (except for ongoing Clansman Terrace
expenses incurred).

h. Costs.

And from the Crown the Plaintiff seeks an ex gratia payment equal to the award against the


53.0 The Plaintiff repeats paragraphs 1 – 50.



54.1 The First Defendant’s affidavit dated 8 April 2005, which formed the sole basis for the initial
court gagging injunction and contempt claim, was a demonstrably false statement that was
materially misleading.

54.2 But for this materially inaccurate and misleading affidavit, the injunction would never have
been issued, the contempt charge could never have eventuated and the defendants’ unfounded
claim could never have advanced.

54.3 The First Defendant is a trained lawyer and therefore must have known before he swore his
8 April 2005 that he was committing an offence under Section 115 of the Crimes Act 1961.

54.4 The First Defendant is a partner of the Second Defendant and his unlawful actions in
initiating these false proceedings were done with the knowledge, assistance and financial support of
the Second Defendant.

Wherefore the Plaintiff Claims Against the Defendants Jointly and Severally for:

i. General damages of $1,250,000

j. Compensation for unjust incarceration at Mt Eden Prison in the amount of $100,000.

k. Aggravated damages of $200,000.

l. Special damages for economic loss that has or might arise from the defendants’ malevolent
actions (details to be provided in due course).

m. Expenses related to the house at 27 Clansman Terrace, Gulf Harbour from July 2007 due to
the inability to sell with clear title due to actions of the defendants in these proceedings.

n. Exemplary damages of $2,150,000.

o. Interest on costs and damages at the rate of 8.25% (except for ongoing Clansman Terrace
expenses incurred).

p. Costs.



Vince Siemer,
Date: 9 January 2008

This document is filed by the Plaintiff, whose address for service is

7 Clansman Terrace
Gulf Harbour

Copies to defendants


27 ClansmanTerrace
Gulf Harbour
Fax: 09 428 2521
First Defendant

147 St. Heliers Bay Road
St Heliers, Auckland
Fax: 09 377 7794
First Defendant

(a registered company in New Zealand) with its registered offices located at Level 16 Tower Centre,
45 Queen St, Auckland
Fax: 09 377 7794
Second Defendant

As represented by the Office of the Solicitor General of New Zealand and The New Zealand Courts
c/o Dr. Michael Cullen, New Zealand Attorney General
Fax: 04 495 8442
Third Defedant

9 January 2008

Submitted by: Vince Siemer, Defendant
27 Clansman Tce.
Gulf Harbour
Facsimile: 09 428 2521

9 January 2008

I, Vincent Ross Siemer, Managing Director of Gulf Harbour do hereby swear:

1. I am the First Defendant and this affidavit is in support of my claim against the defendants
and Crown.

2. At the age of 51, I am a law-abiding citizen who has not been cited for anything in my life
beyond the scope of a traffic ticket, aside from this ordeal.

3. Where documents are already properly identified in the official Court file, I have chosen not
to additionally append them to this affidavit when referenced.

4. Reference to ‘Defendants’ herein is a reference to the First and Second Defendants only,
unless otherwise noted.

5. On 8 April 2005, the First Defendant initiated defamation proceedings against me by way
of a sole affidavit he filed with the High Court in Auckland where he swore in relation to information I
published by way of a billboard and website:
“None of the allegations are true and those allegations that have been investigated by the Serious
Fraud Office and the Institute of Chartered Accountants have been rejected”.

6. On the basis of this single affidavit, Justice Helen Winkelmann – who is a former
Chambers partner of the Defendant’s lawyer Julian Miles QC – granted an ex-parte injunction against
me the evening of Friday, 8 April 2005.

7. This affidavit by the First Defendant was patently false and materially deceptive, in that:
a. Most, if not all, of the allegations published were true and provable as true.
b. The affidavit failed to provide any other specifics as to alleged inaccuracies.

8. More importantly, at the time the First Defendant swore his affidavit he had already accepted
the evidence or admitted to:
a. Overbilling Paragon Oil Systems Limited (“Paragon”) by some $10,000 in fees during his
appointment as receiver.
b. Claiming this overcharge was due to an accounting error.
c. Seeking and obtaining “legal advice” from the Plaintiffs’ lawyer, Robert Fardell, in their
dispute with the Defendants over releasing the key to Paragon’s leased premises after the first
defendant’s receivership had been revoked by the High Court.
d. Being unable to produce notes of meetings, locate fax records, and an admission to
mishandling Paragons records once the first defendant’s accounting irregularities (including the
overbilling of fees) began to surface.
e. Passing off to ICANZ ostensible file notes as having been made by the first defendant’s
assistant at the time the events which they noted occurred and later admitting, when caught out,
that the notes were not so contemporaneously made.
f. Making contact almost a year after the end of his receivership, through his lawyers, with at
least one of the parties that had presented a potential proposal directed to Paragon during the
g. Claiming that the incorrect financial accounts he presented to the court during his
receivership were compiled in conjunction with Paragon,
h. Failing to file an annual return to the IRD on behalf of Paragon during his receivership,
i. Further failing to file the GST return which was due at the start of the receivership and failing
to file an employment PAYE tax return when due,
j. Failing to return the business records of Paragon after his receivership was revoked, and
despite agreeing to do so in the purported settlement agreement.
k. Failing to disclose that the Plaintiff and Paragon were being advised and/or represented by
the same lawyer, Robert Fardell QC, who was advising and/or acting for the Defendants at the time
when the defendants were entering into the purported settlement agreement with the Plaintiff and
l. Failing voluntarily or in a timely manner to disclose to the Plaintiff or Paragon offers and/or
other business proposals directed to Paragon during the course of the first defendant’s receivership
of Paragon.
m. Notifying the High Court that he was unable to recover files relating to the Intellectual
Property during his receivership of Paragon (when in fact he had files in hand).
n. Failing voluntarily or in a timely manner to disclose to the Plaintiff or Paragon the existence
of these Intellectual Property files (concerning Intellectual Property accepted to be worth $750,000),
a failure that continued months after the first defendant’s receivership of Paragon had been revoked
in its entirety and was only revealed after the defendants were threatened with subpoena.
o. Demanding the Plaintiff and his wife inject an additional $124,000 and/or $148,000 in cash
into Paragon before he would pay unsecured creditors,
p. Refusing to pay unsecured creditors on the basis no shareholders would put the additional
funds into Paragon,
q. Attributing liabilities such as legal fees to Paragon when he was receiver and later
conceding to the Institute of Chartered Accountants when pressed (in response to the 26 January
2005 formal complaint he would later request the Institute put on hold) that he had no authority as
receiver to engage legal counsel on behalf of Paragon or incur legal fees.
r. Filing a Statutory Report under the Receivership Act of 1993, in October 2001, which showed
Paragon with $119,647.35 in cash on account after his receivership was revoked despite no further
shareholder capital contributions as he had earlier required.

All of the above allegations were contained on the website which the First Defendant sought the
injunction on by his false affidavit.

9. I had picked up the allegations in relation to the First Defendant’s conduct on Access
Brokerage from a New Zealand newspaper. I am fairly certain the First Defendant did not seek to
injunct the newspaper.

10. The First Defendant’s claim in his affidavit that these allegations had been investigated and
rejected by the Serious Fraud Office and Institute of Chartered Accountants is also materially and
demonstrably misleading. The Serious Fraud Office declined to investigate (a fact duly noted on the
injuncted website) and the Institute of Chartered Accountants investigation into the second
complaint was put on hold at the specific request of the First Defendant after he obtained the
injunction (attached and marked with the letter “A” is a true copy of the letter I received from the
Institute dated 20 May 2005 stating the First Defendant requested they put complaint on hold).

11. Moreover, the Institute took the following position on the first complaint in its 31 July 2002
“The Committee considered that this was essentially a civil matter and should be resolve through
the Courts. The Committee directed that the complainant be advised of its policy of accepting a
new complaint if anything of relevance resulted from civil action.”

12. By law, an injunction must not be allowed if the party seeking it is found to be selective with
the truth – let alone materially inaccurate and misleading.

13. In a de novo hearing held on 28 April 2005 before Ellen France J where only limited and
conflicting affidavit evidence was presented and no evidence was tested, France J upheld a slightly
more limited injunction against the Plaintiff and three other parties but additionally ruled (despite the
overwhelming evidence before Her Honour that the First Defendant had committed perjury in order to
get the first injunction):
a) “There is nothing before me to support a claim that there was inadequate disclosure on the
part of the Defendants or to suggest that the injunction was improperly obtained”. [para. 33 of the 5
May 2005 judgment of FranceJ]
b) “The plaintiffs say that at the heart of Mr Siemer’s allegations is the complaint that Mr
Stiassny labelled the company insolvent. It is clear that is not factual correct from reading Mr
Stiassny’s two reports to the Court”. [para. 45]
c) “The material before the Court shows that Ferriers, by mistake due to a confusion between
Paragon and another company with a similar name, did wrongly charge $10,000.” (underlined for
emphasis) [para. 46]

14. I later proved by way of cross examination of the Defendants’ “Manager” in a hearing before
the Court of Appeal on 8 February 2007 that – by the Defendants’ own definition – they had (falsely)
labelled the company insolvent based on the very same reports Ellen France J claimed to rely on in
reaching the opposite conclusion. In response to my citing unequivocal law which compelled the
Court to revoke the injunction at that moment, President Willy Young repeatedly claimed his judicial
discretion to keep the unlawful injunction in place.

15. On the $10,000 overbilling by the First Defendant, Ellen France J had no evidence this was
“by mistake” other than the Defendants’ claim this was so and the Defendants have since repeatedly
refused to provide bank records supporting their claim this “error” was collected from the other
company “with a similar name” as they purported was the case.

16. The Defendants then prosecuted an application before Judy Potter J, alleging breach of
the injunction by me and Paragon. My lawyer, Colin Henry JD, made application that Her Honour
recuse herself on the basis he had a serious judicial misconduct complaint pending against her in
another matter at the time. She refused this application, as well as his application that she allow
the hearing to be accurately recorded. While the judicial misconduct my lawyer alleged against
Potter J was accurate, Chief Justice Randerson would soon dismiss his complaint. (attached and
marked with the letter “B” is a true copy of Randerson’s 27 June 2005 rejection of my lawyer’s
complaint against Potter J)

17. The Court record CIV2005 404 1808 will confirm that before her judgment Potter J was
made thoroughly aware by me of the Defendants obvious failure to prosecute the substantive claim
they filed 10 months earlier. Despite this, the Defendants’ lawyer responded to Potter J that they
were too busy prosecuting the contempt to devote the appropriate attention to the claim that
underpinned the contempt allegations. Potter J pointedly ignored and openly discounted the
elementary incongruity of the Defendants’ and their counsels’ actions, stating she was not taking
into account my memoranda except to the extent she viewed them as evidence I “remained utterly
unrepentant about the numerous breaches of the orders”.

18. Potter J was not the least bit interested in what my lawyer or I presented to the Court on
behalf of the defence to the alleged contempt and she repeatedly said so. Secret recordings I took
of proceedings before Potter J combine with the incontrovertible Court record to show she made a
point of quickly and flamboyantly dismissing all evidence that favoured the defence or that appeared
to undermine the Defendants’ case for contempt.

19. At one point Potter J strongly threatened me when I suggested that defence counsel was
aware that their witness Vai’s affidavit was deliberately deceptive and that this is why they were
fiercely fighting to prevent Ms Vai’s cross-examination. Despite this submission Potter J refused
my cross-examination of this witness in a hearing where the defendants sought my imprisonment.

20. Potter relied on affidavits the Defendants filed out of time. I was in the courtroom on 27
July 2006 to hear challenge to the admissibility of these three Defendants’ affidavits that had been
filed late and out of time. Potter J claimed she would have her oral ruling after lunch. Upon return
from lunch Potter J read a short procedural ruling that decreed that, while she accepted Mr. Henry
was correct in his interpretation of the rules, she was going to make an exception and allow late
filings in this case because, she ruled, it was a case-managed case and defence counsel effectively
gave up the right to object because he did not raise this objection earlier.

21. When my lawyer Mr Henry responded to Judge Potter’s claim that his inaction was
responsible for her breaking the rules by asking whether he had an obligation to assist the
Defendants by pointing out to them deficiencies in their case, Her Honour quickly responded “No Mr
Henry, you do not!” Potter J then realised her reply made an utter fool of her by exposing her
justification to break the rules as a ruse. Potter J still insisted she had the right to make this ruling
that was in conflict with the High Court rules, but it was clear to me from that point that she never
forgave Mr Henry for exposing her.

22. I note that the written version of Potter’s oral ruling that contravened the High Court rules
was eight pages long when it was finally issued.

23. Midway through the proceedings, Potter J dismissed Mr. Henry and left me without
counsel. I was not in the Courtroom when she did this. Nor did I see Mr. Henry before his
departure. When I was summoned to the Courtroom, I walked in to see Defendants’ counsel on his
feet presenting his case. Potter J then turned her attention to me, berating me and then
questioning my credibility in open court after I accurately stated that I did not know the details of her
dismissal of Mr. Henry and did not know what email she was referring to that purported to cancel my
instructions of Mr. Henry as my counsel.

24. I attempted to defuse the situation by replacing my counsel with Grant Illingworth QC after
Mr. Henry was dismissed by Potter J.

25. I have the utmost respect for the law and the sanctity of an Honourable Court. It is for this
reason that I am compelled by civic duty to recount Mr. Illingworth’s comments to me regarding
Potter J at first meeting in Court.

26. In the context of his taking over legal representation from Mr. Henry mid-stream and on
short notice and his initial appearance before Potter J without the benefit of fully familiarizing
himself with the file, Mr. Illingworth QC sized up our situation at Potter J’s hands to me outside the
Courtroom thusly (in actual quotes):

a) “She (Potter) is the worst: an embarrassment to the Court.”
b) “When she gets a bee in her bonnet, the law does not matter – she rules what she thinks.”
c) “It is your bad luck. It won’t matter who is representing you if she has already made up her
d) He could “set up for appeal” of her eventual ruling (in response to the question of what
benefit he could provide if Potter was this much of a legal loose cannon with a closed mind).

27. These comments by Mr. Illingworth QC – given by him with full knowledge the defence had
not yet begun to present its case – strongly reinforced the state of court affairs other legal
practitioners and my own experience had already indicated; that Potter J was unfit to hold the office,
her actions fundamentally violated her oath of office and her behaviour in this regard is well-known
within the legal community.

28. If genuinely held, these comments by Mr. Illingworth QC – a well-placed, extremely
knowledgeable and senior member of this Court – cannot be ignored.

29. As Mr. Illingworth QC made the point to me at that same time that he got along well with
Potter personally and that he believed Potter J respected him professionally, there is no reason to
believe his assessment is personally jaded against her or anything other than that of a well-reasoned
and informed perspective.

30. At least 3 other respected lawyers with informed knowledge of Potter J’s bench
performance have confirmed to me in equally blunt language that she is unfit to be a judge and that
this assessment of her is broadly shared among lawyers. One stated to me that no lawyer would
dare state this publicly about Potter or in a professional complaint due to the obvious negative
backlash this whistle-blowing would provoke and the sheer futility of doing so. Potter J’s former role
as president of the Law Society was mentioned as one thing that insulates her from legitimate
criticism and accountability.

31. Potter J also refused my own repeated requests to allow accurate recording of the
proceedings after she dismissed my counsel Mr. Henry.

32. Consequently I arranged for secret recordings of proceedings in front of Her Honour.

33. Despite Potter J’s refusal to allow accurate recording of the proceedings, the court file
(CIV2005 404 1808) leaves little doubt that Potter J ignored substantial evidence of impropriety by
the Defendants in that proceeding, none of which was mentioned in her rulings. The audio-tapes
provide more damning evidence of judicial misconduct.

34. I personally stand as witness to:

a) Potter J’s refusal to allow me to cross-examine a witness even though my application
alleged that cross-examination of this witness would likely expose the Defendants’ case as a fraud,
in circumstances where the Defendants were seeking my committal for an alleged contempt. My
lawyer had initially made this application for cross-examination some five months before Potter
denied it.
b) Potter J’s refusal to allow my cross-examination of another witness (Alan Garrett) in
circumstances where the witness was present in the courtroom and my liberty was at stake. I later
proved – before the Court of Appeal on 8 February 2007 – this witnessed had coached a witness to
change his story.
c) Potter J spurned my requests for assistance on procedural matters as an unrepresented
defendant facing a committal charge. I made this request in oral opening after Potter J had
dismissed my counsel.
d) Potter J exacerbated her refusal to assist me by actively assisting Defendants’ counsel on
substantive matters, as she did when she suggested on 19 December 2005 that the Defendants rely
upon case law she then specified. Counsel Mr. Miles QC then retrieved copies of this case for
Potter J at the lunch break.
e) The Defendants’ counsel claiming they needed cross-examination of my affidavit witnesses
to prove their case, only to have Potter J virtually browbeat Senior counsel before he realised she
was prepared to find me guilty on multiple counts with much less evidence than he obviously thought
necessary to get a conviction on one count.
f) The Defendant’s counsel taking the (extraordinary) step in their closing submission of
pointedly telling Potter J the Defendants wished not to rely upon any of the cross-examination of me,
a cross-examination ordered by Potter J initially at the request of Defendants counsel. As I had
refused to answer questions, this request was an evident reflection counsel understood Potter had
overstepped legal bounds.
g) Notwithstanding this request, Potter J’s 16 March 2006 judgment cited my refusal to answer
questions – as well as “no evidence” no less than 5 times in her judgment – as proof of my guilt. As
the Court record shows, the latter was in relation to a witness Her Honour, incredibly, prevented from
being cross-examined, yet she still used what a witness was prevented from saying by judicial order
as “evidence” of my “guilt beyond a reasonable doubt”.
h) I witnessed Defendants’ Counsel make application to Potter J on 19 December 2005 to
cross-examine defence witness Edmundo Tunney. In doing so, he pointedly told Judge Potter that
he could not prove his case unless he could cross-examine Mr Tunney and me.
i) I did not oppose the cross-examination of Mr Tunney. When Potter J responded by claiming
it was not economical for Mr Tunney to appear, I even offered to cover the cost of his appearance –
specifically citing to the judge that my liberty was at stake.
j) Nonetheless, Potter J refused to allow the cross-examination of Edmundo Tunney, instead
telling Mr. Miles QC for the Defendants to think about whether he really wanted to pursue this
application. She then called an early adjournment of the proceedings at 3:18 pm on 19 December
2006 to allow Mr. Miles to think about whether he indeed wanted to pursue the application further
and told him to let her know in the morning. (Potter J would later disparage Mr Tunney’s affidavit
and his truthfulness in Her Honour’s judgment which declared me “guilty beyond a reasonable doubt”
on multiple counts of breaching the injunction).

35. In relation to the Defendants “eye-witnesses” Campbell Rose and Frederick Thompson,
Potter J again berated me in open Court at the contempt hearing, wrongly and emphatically
asserting that I was in the Courtroom when these two testified. In the interest of full disclosure, I
was NOT in the Courtroom during either man’s testimony, although I did walk into the Courtroom in
time to hear the last 5 minutes of Mr. Henry’s cross-examination of Mr. Rose.

36. Both Mr Rose and Mr Thompson were employed by the Defendants’ lawyers at all relevant

37. Neither Mr Rose nor Mr Thompson witnessed any breach of an injunction, and clearly said
as much, yet Potter ruled me “guilty beyond a reasonable doubt” based solely on their testimony.

38. In cross-examination of Defendants’ witness Alan Garrett on 8 February 2007 at the Court
of Appeal in Wellington, I proved without a doubt to the Court that Mr Rose had materially changed
his testimony after being coached by Mr Garrett AND that his original statements could not possibly
pertain to me being the person he witnessed. THIS WAS CAUGHT ON THE “OFFICIAL”

39. President Young whitewashed this certain exculpatory evidence to uphold the conviction
against me.

40. In ruling guilty “beyond reasonable doubt”, Potter J relied extensively on the affidavits of
Defendant employee Alan Garrett in support of her judgment. This was despite:
a) These affidavits providing no direct evidence of any offence,
b) Her Honour’s refusal to allow my cross-examination of Mr Garrett despite his presence in the
body of the Court,
c) No corroboration in the form of evidence of the innuendo and supposition these affidavits
contained – which the Judge relied upon.

41. At the end of the proceedings I was aware that Potter J had a private discussion with Mr.
Miles QC in relation to costs. I was not party to this discussion and was not asked by Potter J to
make any submissions on the matter of costs before unprecedented solicitor and client costs were
awarded by her against me.

42. Despite my providing Potter J with a copy of the Notice of Appeal I quickly filed with the
Court of Appeal – listing 30 grounds for appeal – Justice Potter declined to stay the costs award. In
her refusal order, she discounted not only the strength of the appeal but also the principles
governing judges in such a situation that she herself identified –instead saying “the Defendants are
entitled to the fruits of the judgment”.

43. The straight reality is the Defendants are not entitled to “the fruits” of a judgment that falls
over when it is later determined to be unlawful or fraudulently obtained in a baseless case that
should never have been filed..

44. When I appealed Potter’s rulings on guilt (CA55/05) and costs (CA150/07) against me to
the Court of Appeal, the Appeal Court blamed Potter J’s perceived misconduct on me despite the
fact that seven witnesses – including the Defendants’ sole witness – provided uncontested evidence
that I was gracious and respectful to Judge Potter.

45. The Court of Appeal also ruled the rights afforded the accused by virtue of common law and
legal statute did not pertain to me in this case where the Defendants sought to send me to prison
because it was an “interlocutory application”. Judge Potter’s repeated contravention of fundamental
laws were consequently determined by the Court of Appeal as being within Her Honour’s judicial

46. I had done extensive research on the Costs award by Potter and determined it to be in the
realm of 4-5 times more than any previous precedent – and therefore legally untenable.
Nonetheless, the Court of Appeal upheld the Costs award by addressing it thusly:
“This challenge (to the Costs award) was not pursued in the oral submissions and we, in any event,
see no basis upon which we could legitimately interfere with the way in which the Judge exercised
her discretion to fix costs.” [underlined for emphasis] ([2007] NZCA 117, para. 75)

47. This ruling by the highest court in the land by right ignored the legal factors in my written
submissions as to why this outrageous sum was legally untenable, ignored the fact that it was the
actions of the President himself (abruptly adjourning the hearing) that alone prevented oral
submissions AND, most importantly, ignored the fact that this unprecedented sum could not be
supported on the basis of the law or facts. On this issue of costs, the Court again said the law and
facts do not matter – that judicial discretion is the paramount (and in my case, only) consideration.

48. Before this, in an “Interim Judgment” issued by Court of Appeal Justice Robertson dated
25 September 2006 sought to coerce me to provide extensive personal financial information to the
Defendants which they were not entitled to AND the demand breached established privacy laws in
New Zealand. This unlawful attempt by Robertson J provided no certain purpose for the request
other than consideration by the Court. He pointedly said this private information would not
necessarily be determinative. As Robertson J was known to be a legal expert on privacy law, I
formally requested His Honour provide a definitive purpose for the request and to also support the
request on legal grounds. Robertson J refused.

49. The Court record provided a solid case that the Defendants had long been attempting to
obtain this private personal information on me in order to attack me financially and prevent my
defence to their fabricated defamation charge. I also am aware they had spent huge sums of
money already on private investigators in North America, New Zealand and Italy with the expressed
purpose of digging up information on me.

50. I was unable to find one mitigating factor or reason to suggest Robertson J’s attempt to
unlawfully coerce me to disclose personal information to the Defendants was legally sound or
honourable and was left to conclude on the array of circumstantial evidence that Robertson J was
simply attempting to use his judicial position to unduly assist the Defendants in a clear abuse of
court process, with the consummate aim of preventing me from defending myself. There is no other
reasonable explanation for His Honour’s actions that I could deduce.

51. In a hearing (CA172/07) before the Court of Appeal on 18 June 2007, the appeal centred
around Defendant counsels’ attempts to pad their fees to run up costs. Lead Judge Glazebrook
was openly hostile and disrespectful toward me from the start and demanded that I erase my audio-
recording of the hearing despite the fact it was a public court and the Court itself was recording the
hearing by audio-tape. Before turning off my recorder, she represented that I could obtain the
accurate ‘official’ record afterward by submitting a request with reasons why I required it.

52. When Glazebrook J felt I was no longer recording what she said, she openly defended the
practice of lawyers padding their fees, arguing with me over what she perceived to be a small (and
presumably inconsequential) fraudulent overcharge and refusing to allow relevant evidence which
she was legally compelled to allow and consider that would expose the fraudulent overcharging. Her
Honour then openly invited new evidence from the Bar from the Defendants’ lawyer to support the
Court’s ultimate findings dismissing my appeal.

53. I filed a judicial misconduct complaint with the Judicial Conduct Commissioner the next day
and requested a copy of the audio-tape taken by Court of Appeal staff to support my complaint
against Judge Glazebrook. Glazebrook J refused to provide the audio-tape to me. Then, the
Judicial Conduct Commissioner, in a letter dated 12 November 2007, claimed he was unable to
access Court recordings to investigate judicial misconduct complaints. (attached and marked with
the letter “C” is a true copy of this 12 November 2007 letter from the JCC). The JCC later
dismissed my complaint against Glazebrook J.

54. My own investigation into the Judicial Conduct Commissioner Ian Haynes is that he has
failed to find 1 of 200+ complaints he has received in the three years he has been Commissioner
worthy of a formal investigation by a Judicial Conduct Panel. This was the whole purpose of his
office when Parliament created it with the enactment of The Judicial Conduct Commissioner and
Judicial Conduct Panel Act 2004.

55. I found the events concurring occurring before the appointed trial judge to be equally
troubling. As examples, the trial judge Rodney Hansen J:
a. Ruled in an application brought before him by my lawyer on 8 September 2007 that seven of
the nine issues raised in my lawyer’s application held merit. Hansen J still ruled that I had to pay
50% of the Defendants’ costs. This is the only case I ever heard of where a successful applicant
was ordered to pay the loser’s costs.
b. Later ignored his own ruling as to defence merit, inexplicably reversing himself (in an order
dated 19 April 2007) to strike out my legal defences to the Defendants’ fabricated claims. I have
appealed this ruling to the Court of Appeal (CA226/07).
c. When it was evidentially demonstrated to Hansen J in a hearing 12 February 2007 that the
Defendants had (1) not fulfilled their discovery obligations and (2) hidden relevant email
communication(s) between the First Defendant and Robert Fardell QC, Hansen J required an
affidavit from the First Defendant explaining whether the missing email actually existed. However,
when a “Ms. Greenslade” instead provided an affidavit on behalf of the Defendants suggesting she
did not think the email existed, Hansen J accepted this as proof the email did not exist even though
Ms Greenslade was not a party to the email and could not be held accountable if it surfaced later.
d. Amended his 19 April 2007 judgment without noting on the amended judgment that he had
amended it or changing the date.

56. I was arrested by District Court and New Zealand Police Officers at the Auckland
International Airport at approximately 5:30 am of 12 July 2007, after arriving on an Air New Zealand
flight from Los Angeles.

57. The writ of arrest had been granted by Potter J in an ex-parte trial during my approximate
two week absence from the country despite my informing the Court more than a month before my
departure that I would be out of the country for this period (the date having been set for the hearing
by Potter J without consulting me). In an attempt to advance the matter I even informed the court
what day I would return. I received confirmation from the Court that Potter J was aware of all this.

58. This was the second time in proceedings I have had before Potter J where she conducted
hearings ex-parte (the first being on 5 December 2005).

59. At 10:00 am of the day of my arrest, I was brought to appear before Potter J for sentencing
submissions, having neither a copy of her judgment nor my legal files. At this early hour, Potter
displayed for the gallery – but did not give me a copy – a Supreme Court refusal to consider an
appeal of her earlier judgment which I had filed. The date of the Supreme Court’s refusal to consider
appeal was this same date – 12 July 2007.

60. In the course of three appearances before Potter J that day (adjourned to allow me legal
consultation and to read the judgment on the hearing Potter J conducted in my known two week
absence from the country):
a. Ms. Potter asked me whether I was prepared to make legal submissions for her to
consider on sentencing.
b. When I replied that I needed access to my legal authorities before I could make appropriate
legal submissions Potter J told me she doubted whether I could get better legal authorities than her
law clerk had already provided to her. This comment of the Judge provoked huge laughter from the
packed public gallery.
c. Ms. Potter then said a 24 hour adjournment for the expressed purpose of allowing me
access to my legal authorities was not possible, arguing Defendant’s counsel had “been
inconvenienced enough”. She reluctantly agreed to an adjournment only after opposing counsel said
that he was not opposed to granting such a request.
d. Ms. Potter, notwithstanding the purpose of the adjournment, remanded me to jail, effectively
preventing me from accessing legal files. She did not consider bail despite earlier saying she
would. I had always appeared in Court as required and informed the court when I was not available.
I was certainly no danger to society or flight risk.
e. Ms. Potter, given her long involvement in the case, was also keenly aware that the
Defendants had shown very little interest in advancing their civil case that underpinned these
interlocutory proceedings over the previous two years. Little had changed in the year and a half
since Defendants’ counsel infromed Potter directly that the Defendants had been too busy to pursue
their defamation case that Potter was in now in such a rush to impose a prison sentence on. Her
urgency to hear an application and rush sentencing in this context cannot be easily explained.
Moreover, she never tried to explain this incongruity despite my requests that she do so.
f. It was revealed to me upon my return to New Zealand, that Ms. Potter had also debarred
my defence to this civil case in my absence.

61. When I appeared before Potter J on 13 July 2007 (after the adjournment):
a. Ms. Potter refused my request that the hearing be accurately recorded. She gave no
reason that I am aware of for her refusal of this reasonable request.
b. I made Ms. Potter aware that I was unable to obtain my submissions due to my confinement
that she had ordered. She still insisted the matter proceed and sentencing submissions be made.
This demonstrated to me that she was intentionally keeping me from accessing legal files. The
reason she did this would become apparent.
c. Immediately after providing my limited submissions, I witnessed Ms. Potter READING her
decision. Such action by a judge made it obvious to me that she had pre-determined her decision
ahead of submissions. Moreover, she had based my sentence on faulty case law, claiming at least
one man was sent to prison for three weeks in a similar case I remembered from memory had
actually resulted in no prison time.

62. Potter J pronounced a six week prison sentence, twice as long as the case she falsely
claimed resulted in a three week prison sentence.

63. Despite Potter’s refusal to wait for my return to the Country for a hearing, she quickly
granted opposing counsel an extension for costs submissions when he claimed two weeks later that
he was out of the Country.

64. Potter J then issued a costs ruling dated 31 August 2007 wherein she materially
misrepresented the truth, saying “Mr. Siemer has not filed in reply to issues of costs”. In point of
fact, I filed two Memoranda, one dated 1 August 2007 and another 19 August 2007. As the attached
internal communication by court staff reveals, Ms. Potter took an active role in removing these from
the Court file. (attached and marked with the letter “D” is a true copy of this internal court
communication dated 21 August 2007).

65. I have seen no evidence that opposing counsel took issue with my filing of these
Memoranda dated 1 August 2007 & 19 August 2007 – or even knew whether Potter J was taking this
action against me. To the contrary, my understanding is that opposing counsel did not take issue
with the filing of my Memoranda.

66. After Potter J sent me to Mt Eden prison, the Solicitor General David Collins QC (“S-G”)
sent a letter dated 19 July 2007 to Enlighten Hosting Limited saying he alone considered the
website www.kiwisfirst.co.nz, which they were hosting, defamatory of judges and demanding they
take immediate action or he would pursue them on behalf of the Crown. (attached and marked with
the letter “E” is a true of the S-G’s 19 July 2007 letter).

67. I was Managing Director since the launching of the website in April 2007 and can factually
state that no one had previously challenged the website as defamatory of any judges. No judge or
jury had been asked to make a determination of defamation and the S-G’s letter was awkwardly and
unquestionably ambiguous as to the defamation he alone claimed existed.

68. The S-G had no lawful right to make such a demand under these circumstances. When I
was still in prison, Ms. Penny Bright called the Office of the S-G. Ms Bright then told me the person
she spoke with claimed the S-G did not send such a letter. Ms. Bright somehow obtained a copy of
the letter, then told me she called the Attorney General’s office and was told to simply ignore the S-
G’s unlawful demand letter after she duly pointed out to the staffer the unlawfulness of the S-G’s

69. Such unlawful interference by the S-G in private commerce, expressly stating that he was
acting on behalf of the Crown, while claiming he was standing for the administration of justice and
upholding the laws of New Zealand, must be one of the most egregious abuses of position by a
Crown official in history. But it got worse.

70. I subsequently learnt that the S-G had correspondence from Judge Potter that referred to
the website, leading me to reasonably infer that Her Honour had put him up to this unlawful

71. During this same month, according to my sources, the S-G made a material
misrepresentation to Parliamentary staff with the purpose and effect of unlawfully killing a
Parliamentary Select Committee Inquiry sponsored by the Honourable Member of Parliament
Rodney Hyde into Potter J’s imprisonment of me – the S-G falsely claiming the matter was sub
judice and therefore off limits to Parliament. The S-G’s Office claimed to both Parliamentary staff
and Ms Bright he was going to prosecute me further despite obvious legal impediments which
prevented him from doing so (not the least of which was double jeopardy).

72. This action by the S-G – who has a primary duty to uphold the laws of New Zealand – had
the effect of protecting an errant judge and unduly damaging me further. The errant judge just
happened to be the same one he had correspondence from on the website – a case where he also
had acted in contravention of his legal authority – one Judy Potter J.

73. In response, I arranged a meeting with my local MP, Dr. Lockwood Smith, in early October
2007. Dr Smith initiated his investigation into the matter but had some difficulty getting a definitive
reply, I was later told by his staff. After approximately a month his Personal Assistant (“PA”)
informed me Dr Smith was still working on getting answers, but that the initial response was “there
was nothing in writing” from S-G to Parliamentary staff. Still, the PA said, Dr Smith was determined
to get an answer because “Parliamentary staff do not take action unless they are instructed to do

74. Finally, on 12 December 2007, Dr Smith responded to me by letter, saying his discussions
with the S-G and Parliamentary staff, determined the reasons the Justice and Electoral Committee
did not consider the Inquiry into my wrongful imprisonment “may not have been correct”. The exact
reasons for this remained murky to Dr. Smith despite his investigation. (attached and marked with
the letter “F” is a true copy of this 12 December 2007 letter from MP Dr Smith)

75. I can honestly say in conclusion that I have never met a more dishonest and lawless lawyer
in my life than Judy Potter J. Until this experience I could never have fathomed that such a corrupt
person could remain so personally destructive and unaccountable to the very laws she has sworn an
oath to uphold. As a result of my experience, there is now New Zealand Court of Appeal case
precedent that it is okay to send a man to prison solely on hearsay evidence, in a trial conducted ex-
parte and without accurate recording, where the accused is prevented from cross-examining the
witnesses against him – so long as the trial is advanced by way of an interlocutory application. This
damning indictment of the New Zealand Courts’ debauchery of essential laws in any democracy
might be discounted if not for the uncontested evidence of a further dozen witnesses to the gross
judicial misconduct in this case – as well as both experienced senior counsels’ scathing
assessment of Potter J’s unfitness – notwithstanding the evidence that no judges get disciplined in
New Zealand due to no independent oversight.

76. As far as some of the other players in this alleged conspiracy, the combination of
extraordinary power and unaccountability they enjoy is both an intoxicating and toxic combination. If
my experience demonstrates anything, it is how surprisingly small the stakes need to be to cause a
good number of Crown officials to act in an egregious manner where they cannot be held personally
or professionally accountable for their actions.

77. In an interesting postscript, I tried to file this affidavit at the Auckland High Court as a
counter and cross-claim in the matter CIV2005 404 1808 on 8 January 2008, when the clerk, Ms.
Iutita Esekielu, noticed my name and phoned the Registrar. She returned to tell me they had
instructions to get Registrar or Manager approval before accepting any filings from ‘Mr Siemer’.
When Registrar Tony Mortimer appeared and I asked him if I was getting special treatment, he said
‘no’, stating this is the practice for all ‘lay litigants’. What Mr Mortimer told me was never my
experience. Nor was it the experience of other lay litigants I know of. Consequently, when Ms
Esekielu returned to the counter I asked her, in Mr Mortimer’s presence, whether approval was
needed for all lay litigants or just me. She replied again the instructions on approval were specific to
me. The sad irony is Court staff is now being required to make sure I follow every letter of the High
Court rules – while the Court record plainly shows these same rules, and more essential laws, have
consistently been ignored and overruled in favour of judicial discretion almost every time the rules
and law support me.

78. I know for a fact and can prove that my case is not an isolated way of how certain judges
have corrupted the New Zealand Courts, creating lawless precedent by which all our children must
now live with the consequences of.

Sworn before me this 9th day of )
January 2008 ) _______________________
Vincent Ross Siemer


CC: Human Rights Commissioner Rosslyn Noonan
Judicial Conduct Commissioner Ian Haynes
Attorney General of New Zealand Dr. Michael Cullen
Honourable Member of Parliament Rodney Hide
Honourable Member of Parliament Lockwood Smith